Power of Di~position-Necessity ~or r~:::;-~;m:~:!~T:n purpose of ClV. Code, § 172a, was to give a wife a veto 'powe e over conveyances of communit t r her and s· h . yproper y disadvantageous to ing'to sig::e ~ e d can exe~clse thIS power effectively by refusfor more elabor::e ;~:C:1::' such property, there is no need IlI:' ur.209.
[ [22 C.2d 540] 541 ing that no action to avoid a conveyance of community real property in which the wife has not joined shall be commenced after the expiration of one year from the time of recording such instrument, where the deed to plaintiff was recorded several years before commencement of the action. It was immaterialthat the wife had brought no action to avoid plaintiff's deed, since statutes of limitation, although commonly phrased in terms restricting only the commencement of actions" apply to causes of action raised by the defendant.
[ [22 C.2d 540] 543 husband in executing any instrument by which "community real property or any interest therein is leased for a longer period than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered. . . ." Defendant contends that in order to join in executing the deed the wife must be named therein as grantor.
Two e~rlY cases, lngoldsby v. Jv.an, 12 Cal. 564, and Dentzel v. Waldie, 30 Cal. 138, involved legislation providing that a conveyance of the wife's separate property must 'be signed by the husband, that such a conveyance must be by jo!nt deed, and that it must be executed by husband and wife. (Hittel General Laws of California, (1872) pp. 103, 105, 516.) This court held that the husband complied with these statutes by signing the deed, on the ground that it would be unreasonable to expect a husband who had no interest to convey to be a formal grantor. It declared that. the husband was required to join merely to give or withhold his assent to the transfer, and that he gave his assent by signing the deed. The same reasoning applies to Civil Code section 172a. When that section was adopted in 1917, a wife had no legal interest in the community property (Spreckels v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318 [249 P. 197] ), and since she could grant no interest, the Legislature could hardly have intended her to act as grantor.
[2] The rights of the husband and wife must be measured by the statutes in effect when the property was acquired (McKay v. Lauriston, :supra; Ldhaneyv. La~ haney, supra),' and as the property in this case was acquired before the adoption in 1927 of Civil Code section 161a providing that the wife has a "present, existing, and equal" interest in community property, the wife adequately signified her consent to the transfer by the husband by ,'signing the deed. ( [3] The purpose of section 172a was to give a wife a veto power over conveyances of community property disadvantageous to her (Stewart v. Stewart, supra) and since she can exercise this power effectively by refusing to sign the deed, there is no need for more elaborate procedure.
. [4] Defendant, moreover, asserts her rights under section 17211. too late. At the time the property was acquired this ·section provided that no action to avoid a conveyance of community real property in which the wife had not joined" shall be commenced after the expiration of one year from the :filing for record of such instrument in the recorder's office in the county in which the land is situate." (Stats. 1917, p. 829 .) The deed to plaintiff was recorded several years before the commencement of this action. It is immaterial that the wife has brought no action to avoid plaintiff's deed but invokes section 172a as defendant in a quiet title suit, for statutes of limitation, although commonly phrased in terms restricting only the commencement of actions (Cal. Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J. and Schauer, J., concurred.
CURTIS, J.-I dissent. As a preliminary point of discussion it is necessary to advert briefly to the presentation and ?ispositio~ of this litigation in the trial court. The pleadIng~ are In the usua! short form appropriate to quiet title actIo~s. The. complamt alleges the plaintiff's ownership of certaIn descrIbed real property. and the defendant's assertion: of an interest therein adverse to the plaintiff. The defendant in her answer denies all the averments of the ·complaint except as. to her adverse claim, which she admits but she denies that such claim is without right· in this· c~nnection: defend~nt alleges that she is the owne; and rightfully in posseSSIOn ·of the property and prays that.title be quieted in. her. T~e case was tried by the court sitting without a jury. FollOWIng the general form of the allegations contained in the parties' respective pleadings, the trial court in· its findings resolved the adverse claims of ownership in favor of the defendant and judgment was entered in accordance with that· adjUdication of the title to the property. Such determination rests upon the inefficacy of the deed of 1932 to sustain the plaintiff's cause of action.
The following review of the record will demonstrate the propriety of the trial court's decision: While the defendant [22 C.2d admitted signing the deed in question, she consistently maintained that she had no intention of "passing the title" or giving away [her] home" or "passing any interest" to the plaintiff. It appears that the defendant knew the instrument was drafted in favor of her mother-in-law, but that because of her ill health the defendant did not read the document . and relied solely on her husband's statement that the transaction was "merely for convenience" and a reconveyance by his mother would immediately follow. Illustrative of the defendant's understanding of the matter are these excerpts from her testimony: In answer to th'3 question "What did your husband tell you" when the deed was execlited, the defendant upon direct examination testified: "That he wanted me to sign this deed to his mother merely for a convenience; that very shortly it would be put back in my name, and the other paper I signed [at the same time] he told me that was the deed giving it back to us. I did not read either document due to my condition." On cross-examination when queried as to the identity of the two documents she claimed to have signed contemporaneously the defendant stated. "One he told me was giving the house to his mother and the otber was his mother giving it back to me." Wben asked as to what reason her husband gave her for negotiating the transfer, the defendant answered: "He said he was in some business difficulty and he didn't want the home taken from his two children and his wife-he wanted to safeguard us." Confirmatory of the defendant's understanding of the affair is tbe fact that her possession and enjoyment of the property was in nowise disturbed as the result of this deed. At tbe trial the defendant's husband, Lester H. Strong, admitted that he told the defendant when she signed the deed that such transfer was necessary because of financial difficulties. . Also of some pertinency in thi., connection is the evidence relating' to the matter of consideration in support of the disputed conveyance. At the trial the plaintiff attempted to correlate tbe transaction here involved, with her action some ei!!ht weeks later in deeding two pieces of real estate to her son, Lester H. Strollg.Althoul!h the latter was called to testify on behalf of the plaintiff, he was not asked to corroborate his mother's claim as to the issue of consideration. It appears that the defendant did not know of these later conveyances to her husband, and she, therefore, was unable to testify as to their purpose. However, she did state that at the time in question the plaintiff was financially interested
July 1943] STRONG' 'V. STRONG [22 C.2d 540] 549 in, certain business ventures of ,Lester Ii. Strong and concerned with their successful outcome. On cross-examination the plaintiff admitted that she frequently gave her son money or property on which he might obtain loans to relieve pressing financial obligations. In view of the significant discrepancy between the respective dates of the mentioned deeds; the nat" ural as. well as business relationship between the plaintiff and Lester H. Strong, and theconflic'ting possibilities' as to .
. th~ object of the plaintiff's transfer of realty to her son, the trIal court, having the advantage of 'observing the demea:nor of the parties on the witness-stand, apparently elected. to discredit the plaintiff's claim as to the existence of any connection between the successive conveyanceS and concluded that they were independent transactions, not intended as consid-' eration one for the other. In accord with the settled rule that it is within the exclusive province of the triai court to pass ripon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, the implied finding against the plaintiff on the issue of consideration would not be disturbed on appeal. From this state of the record it can readily be inferred that the defendant was induced to sign the deed of 1932 solely by reason of the persuasion and misleading explanation of her husband as to the feigned nature of the transfer; that she never realized the full significance or import of the instrument, but that she had implicit trUst in her husband's management of their business affairs and accepted What he said without question; and that the confidence she reposed in him was betrayed in an attempt to consummate a conveyance of their community real property to her detriment. Thus, there was an absence of actual consent to the transfer on the part of the defendant, and under the prevailing circumstances the plaintiff is not in a position to urge the binding force Of the defendant 'ssignature to the deed as an unchallengeable manifestation of assent to the conveyance. While it does not appear that the plaintiff took part in the procurement of the deed the equities of the case support the defendant's claim to re: lief upon the basis of her husband's breach of his fiduciary duty to protect her interests and the want of·consideration in support of the transfer. From this aspect the present situation is akin in principle to those cases wherein a gift, grant or be-' quest obtained by undue influence of a third person is vitiated thereby, and it is held immaterial that in the procurement [22 C.2d thereof the immediate beneficiary did not participate. (Moore v. Moore, 81 Cal. 195 [22 P. 589, 874] ; see cases collected in 96 A.L.R. 613-615.) The majority opinion holds that these evidentiary matters would have no bearing upon the determination or this appeal because the defendant did not plead the fraudulent character of the deed nor did the trial court make a finding based thereon. However, such omissions in the record do not militate against the propriety of the judgment nullifying the operative effect of the conveyance to the plaintiff in 1932~ In a quiet title suit, unlike other actions generally, a defendant under b general denial may raise the issue that the plaintiff acquired title in whole or in part through a fraudulent transfer affecting her claim of title thereto. The majority opinion further holds that the defendant is not now in a position to question the validity of the deed to the plaintiff because the time limit of one year from the date of recordation of the instrument, the period specified in section 172a as available for the wife's exercise of her right to u.void an unauthorized conveyance, had expired several years before the commencement of this quiet title action. However, July 1943] STRONO V. STRONG [22 C.2d 540] 551 this statement of the law has no application .
• hen the validity of the deeq is questioned on the ground of. fraud rather than non-compliance with the terms' of section 172a. A statute of limitations is a special defense which may be either relied 0:0. : "However, it has been held that unless the adverse party invokes the plea of the statute at the trial, and brings to the attention of the trial court his purpose to offer evidence in support of such plea, the court cannot assume that he desires to make any such defense, and he cannot invoke the plea for the first time on appeal. [Citing authorities.] '1 . Consistent with this review of the record herein, the de-' fendant is entitled to relief from the operative effect· of the disputed conveyance. In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed.
. Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August 19, 19~3. Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearmg.
